Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring

Takuo Sugaya and Satoru Takahashi
Additional contact information
Takuo Sugaya: Princeton University

No 1325, Working Papers from Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program.

Abstract: Players coordinate continuation play in repeated games with public monitoring. This paper asks the robustness of such equilibrium play with respect to privatemonitoring perturbations that are ex-ante close to the public-monitoring structure. We show that, in two-player games with full support of public signals, no perfect public equilibrium is robust to private-monitoring perturbations under a regularity condition. This non-robustness result does not apply to belief-free equilibria, which violate the regularity condition. Indeed, we show that, in two-player games with an individual rank condition on public signals, every interior belief-free equilibrium is robust to private-monitoring perturbations. We also argue by means of an example that the non-robustness result is sensitive to the assumption that every private signal must be interpreted as some public signal with probability 1, and not with probability close to 1.

Keywords: equilibrium selection; supermodular game; incomplete information; robustness; contagion; global game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-05
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://detc.princeton.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/ ... Sugaya_Takahashi.pdf
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://detc.princeton.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/wp016_2011_Sugaya_Takahashi.pdf [302 Found]--> https://detc.princeton.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/wp016_2011_Sugaya_Takahashi.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://economics.princeton.edu/the-william-s-dietrich-ii-economic-theory-center/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/wp016_2011_Sugaya_Takahashi.pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pri:metric:wp016_2011_sugaya_takahashi.pdf

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Bobray Bordelon ().