The Dark Side of Human Decision-Making: A Review of Behavior in the Joy-of-Destruction Experiments

Joe Young Jeon () and Shakun Mago ()
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Joe Young Jeon: Department of Economics, University of Reading
Shakun Mago: Robins School of Business, University of Richmond, VA

No em-dp2026-05, Economics Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of Reading

Abstract: Despite extensive evidence on cooperation and prosocial behavior, individuals frequently engage in costly destructive actions that yield no material benefit. This paper surveys experimental literature on the Joy-of-Destruction game, a canonical framework designed to isolate such antisocial behavior. We review evidence across a range of experimental designs, treatment conditions, and subject populations, and show that destruction persists even when standard strategic, distributive, and reciprocity-based motives are eliminated. The findings suggest that such behavior is driven by a combination of intrinsic utility from harming others, belief-driven preemptive responses, and contextual pressures. Psychological traits, group identity, and environmental factors further shape destructive choices. We also examine institutional interventions that have been shown to mitigate such behavior. Finally, we compare the Joy-of-Destruction framework to related money-burning games to clarify how differences in experimental design shape the interpretation of destructive behavior - whether as intrinsically motivated or as a response to inequality and procedural concerns.

Keywords: joy of destruction; money burning; antisocial behavior; nastiness; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D63 D74 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2026-06-21
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