Matching with phantoms

Bruno Decreuse

No 1097, 2009 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: Searching partners involves informational persistence that lowers future traders' matching probability. In this paper, traders that are no longer available but left tracks on the labor market are called phantoms. I examine a discrete-time matching market in which phantom traders are a by-product of search activity, no coordination frictions are assumed, and non-phantom traders may lose time trying to match with phantom traders. The resulting aggregate matching technology features increasing returns to scale in the short run, but has constant returns to scale in the long run. I discuss the labor market evidence and argue that there is observational equivalence between phantom unemployed and on-the-job seekers.

Date: 2009
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Related works:
Journal Article: Matching with Phantoms (2017)
Working Paper: Matching with Phantoms (2017)
Working Paper: Matching with Phantoms (2014)
Working Paper: MATCHING WITH PHANTOMS (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed009:1097

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