Turnover and Accountability of Appointed and Elected Judges

Claire Lim
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Claire Lim: Stanford University

No 190, 2009 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: Our findings are as follows. First, the sentencing behavior of elected judges is an important determinant of their reelection. Hence, elected judges face serious reelection incentives on their behavior, which appointed judges do not face. However, the extent and the direction of the effect are substantially different depending on the political orientation of their constituency. Second, party affiliation and political climate during an election significantly affect the reelection probability of the elected judges. Lastly, our estimates show that appointed judges are more homogeneous than elected judges in terms of their sentencing preferences.

Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed009:190

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