Competing with Asking Prices

Ronald Wolthoff, Ludo Visschers and Benjamin Lester

No 644, 2015 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: In many markets, sellers advertise their good with an asking price. This is a price at which the seller will take his good off the market and trade immediately, though it is understood that a buyer can submit an offer below the asking price and that this offer may be accepted if the seller receives no better offers. Despite their prevalence in a variety of real world markets, asking prices have received little attention in the academic literature. We construct an environment with a few simple, realistic ingredients and demonstrate that using an asking price is optimal: it is the pricing mechanism that maximizes sellers' revenues and it implements the efficient outcome in equilibrium. We provide a complete characterization of this equilibrium and use it to explore the positive implications of this pricing mechanism for transaction prices and allocations.

Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Competing with asking prices (2017)
Working Paper: Competing with Asking Prices (2016)
Working Paper: Competing with Asking Prices (2015)
Working Paper: Competing with Asking Prices (2014)
Working Paper: Competing with Asking Prices (2014)
Working Paper: Competing with Asking Prices (2014)
Working Paper: Competing with asking prices (2013)
Working Paper: Competing with Asking Prices (2013)
Working Paper: Competing with Asking Prices (2013)
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