Can Partial Fiscal Coordination Be Welfare Worsening? A model of tax competition

Maurice Marchand, Pierre Pestieau and Motohiro Sato

CREPP Working Papers from Centre de Recherche en Economie Publique et de la Population (CREPP) (Research Center on Public and Population Economics) HEC-Management School, University of Liège

Abstract: Most work on tax competition argues that mobile factors tend to be undertaxed except if there is coordination of tax policies. Full coordination is not however always feasible, and as a consequence some measures of partial coordination have been proposed such as minimal witholding taxes on interest income. We show that partial coordination can be in some instances welfare worsening and that then no coordination is to be preferred.

Keywords: tax competition; tax coordination; witholding tax (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H2 H7 H87 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Related works:
Journal Article: Can partial fiscal coordination be welfare worsening?: A model of tax competition (2003)
Working Paper: Can partial fiscal coordination be welfare worsening? A model of tax competition (2003)
Working Paper: Can partial fiscal coordination be welfare worsening ? A model of tax competition (2002)
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