An Examination of Evidence on Voting Rights and The Market for Corporate Control

Wayne H. Mikkelson and M. Megan Partch
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Wayne H. Mikkelson: College of Business Administration, University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon 97403.
M. Megan Partch: College of Business Administration, University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon 97403.

Australian Journal of Management, 1985, vol. 10, issue 2, 67-82

Abstract: This paper examines evidence related to voting rules and the market for voting rights. Several important findings emerge from recent studies. One set of evidence implies that it is desirable to have an active market in voting rights of a firm while another set of evidence indicates that lessening the effectiveness of this market is not harmful. Our view of this apparent contradiction is that all firms do not benefit equally from an active market for corporate control. Rather, for some firms, an optimal strategy may be to restrict participation in this market, although the characteristics of such firms are not clear. In general, we suggest that the effect of the market for corporate control on the value of firms is not fully understood.

Keywords: CORPORATE CONTROL; VOTING RIGHTS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1985
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ausman:v:10:y:1985:i:2:p:67-82

DOI: 10.1177/031289628501000204

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