Interdependence and Conflict: When Does Symmetry Matter?

Mark J.C. Crescenzi
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Mark J.C. Crescenzi: Universiy of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2003, vol. 20, issue 1, 73-92

Abstract: This article introduces an altemative to the study of economic interdependence and interstate conflict. Typically, scholars have relied upon relative levels of economic activity to characterize symmetry in interdependence. Instead, I argue that the key to understanding the role of symmetry in interdependence and conflict lies in the relationship between a state's exit (opportunity) costs and the costs it is willing to bear in the face of political conflict with another state. Asymmetry with respect to two states' exit costs/threshold relationships can generate bargaining power that constrains the use of force. This approach improves our understanding of the complex relationship between interdependence and conflict. It also suggests that current measurements of economic interdependence may fail to identify situations where interdependence plays a role in conflict.

Date: 2003
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:compsc:v:20:y:2003:i:1:p:73-92

DOI: 10.1177/073889420302000104

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