Bargaining, War, and Alliances

R. Harrison Wagner
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R. Harrison Wagner: Department of Government University of Texas Austin, Texas, USA, rhwagner@mail.utexas.edu

Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2004, vol. 21, issue 3, 215-231

Abstract: As a way of clarifying and evaluating competing claims made by writers on alliances and the balance of power, I extend recent work on the relation between bargaining and war to a three-state setting where coalitions are possible. I show that if what is commonly called “balancing†occurs at all, it is because it is seen as a way of reducing the risk associated with possible exogenous changes in the distribution of military capabilities. It is therefore not necessarily inconsistent with what is called “bandwagoning,†but can actually make bandwagoning more likely. Moreover, balancing need not occur for international systems to be stable.

Keywords: bargaining; war; alliances; balance of power; balancing; bandwagoning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:compsc:v:21:y:2004:i:3:p:215-231

DOI: 10.1080/07388940490487270

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