Presidents on the cycle: Elections, audience costs, and coercive diplomacy

Giacomo Chiozza

Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2017, vol. 34, issue 1, 3-26

Abstract: This study investigates an observable implication of audience cost theory. Building upon rational expectations theories of voters’ choice and foreign policy substitutability theory, it posits that audience costs vary over the electoral calendar. It then assesses whether US presidents’ major responses in international crises reflect the variability in audience costs in an analysis of 66 international crises between 1937 and 2006. Using out-of-sample tests, this study finds that tying-hand commitment strategies were more frequent closer to presidential elections, as expected from audience cost theory. It also finds that the fluctuation of audience costs over the electoral calendar is non-linear.

Keywords: Audience costs; elections; out-of-sample tests; US presidents (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:compsc:v:34:y:2017:i:1:p:3-26

DOI: 10.1177/0738894215593677

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