Talking bodies: Hostage concessions in civil war

Blair Welsh

Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2026, vol. 43, issue 1, 35-57

Abstract: Organizations often set high demands for the release of hostages in civil war. Despite a purported restraint on state concessions to hostage-takers, exchanges between militants and national governments for the release of hostages have reached unprecedented levels in recent years. It is unknown, however, when states concede to insurgents for the release of hostage victims. Given substantial costs associated with granting concessions, I argue that governments only concede for the release of hostages where the victim is likely to attract attention, compelling states to intervene. This occurs when the hostage is a high-profile victim. I test the theory with original and granular data on the Philippines (1975–2018). The data document hostage-takings and concessions between six insurgent groups and the government. The analysis provides robust support for the theory. The findings unveil important insights for policy and research.

Keywords: Civil war; hostage-taking; concessions; negotiation‌; terrorism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/07388942251317428 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:compsc:v:43:y:2026:i:1:p:35-57

DOI: 10.1177/07388942251317428

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Conflict Management and Peace Science from Peace Science Society (International)
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().