The Impact of Politically Connected CEOs and Boards of Directors on Firm Performance: A Study of Vietnamese Family and Nonfamily Firms

Trung Quang Dinh, Andrea Calabrò, Giovanna Campopiano and Rodrigo Basco

Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 2022, vol. 46, issue 5, 1284-1316

Abstract: Integrating new institutional economics and resource dependence theory, this study investigates whether in transition economies, characterized by shifting from centrally commanded to more market-oriented economies, there are performance differences among family firms (FFs), nonfamily firms (non-FFs), and former state-owned enterprises (former SOEs), and whether political connections affect these differences. Our findings suggest that FFs outperform non-FFs and former SOEs, unless non-FFs have politically connected CEOs. The performance gap in favor of FFs increases at high levels of board political connection intensity. Among FFs, the top-performing ones either promote nonfamily leadership or combine family leadership with politically connected boards of directors.

Keywords: family firm; political connection; transition economy; family CEO; board of directors; firm performance; former SOEs; Vietnam (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:entthe:v:46:y:2022:i:5:p:1284-1316

DOI: 10.1177/1042258720985477

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