The Cyprus Conflict as a Prisoner's Dilemma Game

Malvern Lumsden
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Malvern Lumsden: Department of Social Psychology University of Bergen (Norway)

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1973, vol. 17, issue 1, 7-32

Abstract: One hundred thirty-four Greek Cypriot and 51 Turkish Cypriot student teachers evaluated Cyprus now and in five years' time under four contingencies (peace, war, Enosis, and Taksim) on self-anchoring scales. Presentation of the resulting measures of utility in matrix form shows that of the 78 possible nonequivalent 2 x 2 games, the Cyprus conflict may be regarded as a Prisoner's Dilemma game where war is not seen as the worst possibility by either side, and peace offers a Pareto-optimal solution. Measures to resolve such conflicts suggested by the experimental literature are discussed.

Date: 1973
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:17:y:1973:i:1:p:7-32

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