An Experimental Test of a Rationalistic Theory of Deterrence

Stan A. Kaplowitz
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Stan A. Kaplowitz: Department of Sociology Michigan State University

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1973, vol. 17, issue 3, 535-572

Abstract: An experimental game tested a rationalistic theory of compliance to threats, which assumes the following: (1) The greater the credibility of the threat source the more compliant the target (subject). (2) The credibility of the threat source is determined by (a) the cost to the source of carrying out the threat and (b) the target's knowledge, or lack of knowledge, of the source's behavior in interacting with other threat targets. The theory was clearly disconfirmed. The results can, however, be explained by assuming that subjects regarded the source as violating the norm of equity. Interestingly, the subjects' postgame assessments of how they would have played in other experimental conditions confirm our original rationalistic theory. This suggests that many people assume that to insist on equity is to rationally pursue one's own self-interest.

Date: 1973
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:17:y:1973:i:3:p:535-572

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