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Perception of Opponent's Motives and Cooperation in a Mixed-Motive Game

Sanford L. Braver and Bruce Barnett
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Sanford L. Braver: Department of Psychology Arizona State University
Bruce Barnett: Department of Psychology Arizona State University

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1974, vol. 18, issue 4, 686-699

Abstract: Two studies investigated the effects of the perception of the opponent's motives and incentives to defect on cooperation in a mixed-motive game. Study I varied the perceived goal of the other (by instructions) and the incentive of the other to defect (by payoff values). Study II varied the other's incentive as well as the subject's incentive to defect, both by payoff values. The results indicated that the perceived goal of the other strongly influenced the subject's cooperation. The incentive of the other also affected cooperation, except when the other was assumed to be pursuing a benevolent goal. Finally the subject's incentive did not affect his cooperation nearly as much as did his opponent's incentive.

Date: 1974
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:18:y:1974:i:4:p:686-699

DOI: 10.1177/002200277401800408

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