An Experimental Test of the Core in a Simple N-Person Cooperative Nonsidepayment Game

Janet E. Berl, Richard D. McKelvey, Peter C. Ordeshook and Mark D. Winer
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Janet E. Berl: School of Urban and Public Affairs Carnegie-Mellon University
Richard D. McKelvey: School of Urban and Public Affairs Carnegie-Mellon University
Peter C. Ordeshook: Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences Stanford University
Mark D. Winer: School of Urban and Public Affairs Carnegie-Mellon University

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1976, vol. 20, issue 3, 453-479

Abstract: This essay reports on seventeen experiments that test the validity of the Core as a solution to n-person cooperative games in a nontransferable utility context. Money is used to induce preferences, but subjects are not permitted to negotiate about nor transfer money amongst themselves. Instead, using majority rule, subjects must negotiate over and choose some policy in a two-dimensional “issue†space. Five 5-person games are run in which the subjects' utility is a function of the Euclidean distance from their ideal policy. Twelve 3-person games are run using a city-block representation of preferences. Both series of experiments strongly support the Core as a solution concept when it exists.

Date: 1976
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:20:y:1976:i:3:p:453-479

DOI: 10.1177/002200277602000304

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