Transforming a Nation-Dominant International System

Dina A. Zinnes, John V. Gillespie and G. S. Tahim
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Dina A. Zinnes: Indiana University
John V. Gillespie: Indiana University
G. S. Tahim: Indiana University

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1978, vol. 22, issue 4, 547-564

Abstract: This paper investigates the problem of system transformation. Focusing on one attribute of system structure, the distribution of power, it is shown that certain power distributions are incompatible with certain optimizing behaviors. Specifically, it is shown that if a system contains a dominant nation, a nation whose power exceeds the sum of the power of all remaining nations, and if nations optimize using stochastic inputs, then the dominant nation will lose its superiority. It is further shown, through a generalization of the argument, that the application of stochastic inputs also insures against subsystem dominance, thus providing a guarantee against “spheres of influence†by some nations over subsets of nations. The general argument is substantiated by showing that similar results can be obtained by way of two different forms of analysis.

Date: 1978
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:22:y:1978:i:4:p:547-564

DOI: 10.1177/002200277802200401

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