A Competitive Test of the M1 (i) and M1 (im) Bargaining Sets

H. Andrew Michener, Melvin M. Sakurai, Kenneth Yuen and Thomas J. Kasen
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H. Andrew Michener: University of Wisconsin
Melvin M. Sakurai: University of Wisconsin
Kenneth Yuen: University of Wisconsin
Thomas J. Kasen: University of Wisconsin

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1979, vol. 23, issue 1, 102-119

Abstract: Two game theoretic solution theories, the M 1 (i) bargaining set and the M 1 (im) modified bargaining set, were tested competitively in six three-person games with side-payments. Subjects were 90 males who participated in 30 bargaining groups. Results showed that M 1 (im) is significantly and consistently superior to M 1 (i) in predicting the distribution of payoffs in these conflicts (p

Date: 1979
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:23:y:1979:i:1:p:102-119

DOI: 10.1177/002200277902300106

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