Measuring Strategic Stability with Two-Strike Nuclear Exchange Models

Jeffrey H. Grotte
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Jeffrey H. Grotte: Institute for Defense Analyses

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1980, vol. 24, issue 2, 213-239

Abstract: This article presents a quantification of the notion of strategic stability as it pertains to changes in U.S. and Soviet nuclear postures. Based on the use of two-strike strategic exchange models, this approach can be used to measure the degree to which proposed posture changes are stabilizing or destablizing. The categories "predominantly stabilizing" and "predominantly destabilizing" are introduced to describe changes which, in sequence, produce respectively stabilizing and destabilizing results.

Date: 1980
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:24:y:1980:i:2:p:213-239

DOI: 10.1177/002200278002400202

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