Mathematical Models of a Three-Nation Arms Race

John E. Hunter
Additional contact information
John E. Hunter: Department of Psychology Michigan State University

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1980, vol. 24, issue 2, 241-252

Abstract: Three models of a three-nation arms race are presented: an all-against-all model, a model in which two nations are allied against the third, and a model in which one of the nations has a secret alliance with the other two. In the all-against-all situation, the model predicts an infinitely explosive arms race as each country fears an alliance of the other two. In the two-sided alliance, the model predicts that there will be an mitial increase until the weaker side approaches parity, after which there will be a mutual deescalation. If one nation signs secret treaties with each of the others, then it immediately deescalates. The other two nations then enter a two-sided arms race in which there will be an initial increase until the weaker nation reaches parity followed by mutual deescalation. These models suggest that two-way arms races would not infinitely escalate if it were not for the fear of third party alliances.

Date: 1980
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/002200278002400203 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:24:y:1980:i:2:p:241-252

DOI: 10.1177/002200278002400203

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Conflict Resolution from Peace Science Society (International)
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().