Deterrence and Bargaining

R. Harrison Wagner
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R. Harrison Wagner: Department of Government, University of Texas at Austin

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1982, vol. 26, issue 2, 329-358

Abstract: Recent disputes about whether nuclear superiority still has any meaning raise the question of what relation exists between threats of nuclear punishment and bargaining power. This article argues that deterrence theory has provided little assistance in discussing that question. It has often focused exclusively on the defender's influence on the decision calculus of the aggressor or on the problem of avoiding a “reciprocal fear of surprise attack.†When it has touched on the question of bargaining advantage, it has used inappropriate models and failed to draw correct conclusions from the models it has used. The article outlines the main ways in which deterrence theory must be corrected, focusing especially on the distinction between two kinds of threats whose implications for bargaining are quite different.

Date: 1982
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:26:y:1982:i:2:p:329-358

DOI: 10.1177/0022002782026002007

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