Some Necessary Conditions for International Policy Coordination

Martin W. Sampson
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Martin W. Sampson: Political Science Department, University of Minnesota

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1982, vol. 26, issue 2, 359-384

Abstract: N-actor cooperative game theory may be a useful body of knowledge for understanding aspects of international policy coalitions. Using a 1974 OPEC decision as an illustrative case, this article demonstrates that game theory is a source of ideas about necessary conditions for international policy coordination and also a means of testing those ideas with empirical data. The article considers three sets of possibly necessary conditions: the imputation, the core, and the convex game. The results of the empirical test are supportive of the core as a set of necessary conditions. The test is not supportive of the convex game, which substantively is a more interesting set of necessary conditions. The article concludes with observations about the policy relevance of knowing necessary conditions.

Date: 1982
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:26:y:1982:i:2:p:359-384

DOI: 10.1177/0022002782026002008

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