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Temptation and the Maintenance of Trust

Byron A. Matthews, William M. Kordonski and Eliot Shimoff
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Byron A. Matthews: Department of Sociology, University of Maryland, Baltimore County
William M. Kordonski: Psychological Health Services, Columbia, Maryland
Eliot Shimoff: Department of Psychology, University of Maryland, Baltimore County

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1983, vol. 27, issue 2, 255-277

Abstract: Levels of trust, defined by how far ahead in earnings each dyad member risked putting the other, were continuously monitored during two-party exchange. Two experiments investigated whether a bilateral punishment capability would enable trust to be maintained when a strong incentive to be untrustworthy (temptation) was introduced. In Experiment I (total subtraction), both persons were provided with a “start over†button that could set the other person's session earnings to zero. In Experiment II (partial subtraction), the start over button was replaced by a “subtraction†button that subtracted ten points from the other's earnings. All pairs had previously demonstrated either unwillingness to trust or untrustworthy behavior during temptation. Experiment I found that the availability of the total substraction option allowed trust to be maintained in four of six pairs. In Experiment II, partial subtraction had similar effects for three of six pairs. A bilateral punishment capacity may thus facilitate the maintenance of trust under conditions that otherwise produce distrust and exploitation.

Date: 1983
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:27:y:1983:i:2:p:255-277

DOI: 10.1177/0022002783027002003

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