Temptation and the Maintenance of Trust
Byron A. Matthews,
William M. Kordonski and
Eliot Shimoff
Additional contact information
Byron A. Matthews: Department of Sociology, University of Maryland, Baltimore County
William M. Kordonski: Psychological Health Services, Columbia, Maryland
Eliot Shimoff: Department of Psychology, University of Maryland, Baltimore County
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1983, vol. 27, issue 2, 255-277
Abstract:
Levels of trust, defined by how far ahead in earnings each dyad member risked putting the other, were continuously monitored during two-party exchange. Two experiments investigated whether a bilateral punishment capability would enable trust to be maintained when a strong incentive to be untrustworthy (temptation) was introduced. In Experiment I (total subtraction), both persons were provided with a “start over†button that could set the other person's session earnings to zero. In Experiment II (partial subtraction), the start over button was replaced by a “subtraction†button that subtracted ten points from the other's earnings. All pairs had previously demonstrated either unwillingness to trust or untrustworthy behavior during temptation. Experiment I found that the availability of the total substraction option allowed trust to be maintained in four of six pairs. In Experiment II, partial subtraction had similar effects for three of six pairs. A bilateral punishment capacity may thus facilitate the maintenance of trust under conditions that otherwise produce distrust and exploitation.
Date: 1983
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002783027002003 (text/html)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:27:y:1983:i:2:p:255-277
DOI: 10.1177/0022002783027002003
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Journal of Conflict Resolution from Peace Science Society (International)
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().