Sources of Bureaucratic Influence

Michael F. Altfeld and Gary J. Miller
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Gary J. Miller: Department of Political Science, Michigan State University

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1984, vol. 28, issue 4, 701-730

Abstract: Classical Weberian models of bureaucratic influence emphasize expertise as a source of political power. Recent economic models suggest that bureaucratic expertise springs from control over the agenda of voting bodies. This article differentiates the two types of bureaucratic influence and reports on a series of experiments that varies the amount of expertise and agenda control in the same committee decision-making setting. Initial results indicate that either a monopoly on information or a monopoly on agenda control can enable an outsider to influence committee choices away from what would otherwise be the majority winning alternative for the committee. The different sources of bureaucratic influence are exercised in different, possibly mutually exclusive ways, so that both kinds of monopoly do not necessarily help the bureaucrat any more than one kind of influence by itself. The reason seems to be that agenda control is based on a combative, bargaining relationship between the convener and the committee, whereas expertise seems to be based on building a professional relationship of trust between expert and committee.

Date: 1984
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:28:y:1984:i:4:p:701-730

DOI: 10.1177/0022002784028004006

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