The Optimal Level of Generosity in a Selfish, Uncertain Environment

Per Molander

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1985, vol. 29, issue 4, 611-618

Abstract: The tit-for-tat strategy in iterated prisoners' dilemma games is examined in the presence of disturbances. It is shown that performance deteriorates drastically at arbitrarily low noise levels. The situation may be remedied by introducing some unconditional generosity. This may be done without exposing oneself to the risk of exploitation by the other party.

Date: 1985
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:29:y:1985:i:4:p:611-618

DOI: 10.1177/0022002785029004004

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