Arms Control Verification

Karl Pieragostini

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1986, vol. 30, issue 3, 420-444

Abstract: The arms control experience of the past 25 years has shown verification to be the key to the future success of formal arms control agreements, and has highlighted how crucial cooperation is to the verification effort. Unfortunately, fundamental disagreement persists within the United States over what we should expect from verification, and we seem to have lost sight of how far we have come with the Soviet Union. The first half of this article outlines the questions involved in the debate over verification, how much of it is enough, and what we should do about suspected cheating. This lays the groundwork for a detailed discussion of the precedents already established for cooperative verification. These include measures to foster resolution of treaty-related problems, increase the effectiveness of national technical means, provide for on-site inspection, and allow the use of “black box†sensors. These precedents represent considerable progress of which we should remind ourselves, especially at a time when they may be placed in jeopardy by our more recent lack of success in arms control.

Date: 1986
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002786030003002 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:30:y:1986:i:3:p:420-444

DOI: 10.1177/0022002786030003002

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Conflict Resolution from Peace Science Society (International)
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().