U.S. Defense Spending, Electoral Cycles, and Soviet-American Relations

Gary Zuk and Nancy R. Woodbury
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Gary Zuk: Department of Political Science, Virginia Polytechnic Institute, and State University
Nancy R. Woodbury: Department of Political Science, Duke University

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1986, vol. 30, issue 3, 445-468

Abstract: We investigate whether U.S. defense spending has been systematically increased (or decreased) during national election years for the presumed purpose of influencing the economy in general and the electorate in particular. Our analysis of five major kinds of defense spending essentially showed no support for a two- or four-year electoral-defense spending cycle. Instead, we find that two international factors, war and the state of U.S.-Soviet relations, have been largely responsible for the distinctively irregular pattern of post-1945 U.S. defense spending.

Date: 1986
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:30:y:1986:i:3:p:445-468

DOI: 10.1177/0022002786030003003

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