The Information Dilemma

Otto Keck
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Otto Keck: International Institute for Environment and Society, Science Center Berlin

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1987, vol. 31, issue 1, 139-163

Abstract: Information asymmetries persist because in certain situations the value of information cannot be appropriated by the one who has it. A game-theoretic model of information asymmetries is presented, showing that under certain conditions there exists a prisoner's dilemma. The model is used to clarify the failure of markets to transmit certain types of information, to explain policy failure in regulation without recourse to government failure, and to identify new types of transaction failure in hierarchy and politics.

Date: 1987
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:31:y:1987:i:1:p:139-163

DOI: 10.1177/0022002787031001008

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