Minimal Nuclear Deterrence

Barry Nalebuff
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Barry Nalebuff: Department of Economics and Center of International Studies, Princeton University

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1988, vol. 32, issue 3, 411-425

Abstract: This article develops a rational theory of minimal nuclear deterrence: What is the minimal amount of weapons needed to maintain a stable balance of power? By searching for the requirements of minimal nuclear deterrence, we hope to gain a better understanding of how to proceed with arms reduction without compromising the value of deterrence.

Date: 1988
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:32:y:1988:i:3:p:411-425

DOI: 10.1177/0022002788032003001

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