Escalation and Cooperation in Conflict Situations

Wolfgang Leininger
Additional contact information
Wolfgang Leininger: University of Bonn

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1989, vol. 33, issue 2, 231-254

Abstract: We present a new game-theoretic analysis of an abstract auction game that captures essential strategic aspects of escalation phenomena. Two competitive adversaries commit resources irreversibly in order to win an indivisible prize; the winner will take the prize while both winner and loser incur the cost of their bids (investments). Following O'Neill (1986), we first reexamine a discrete version of the game and emphasize some strategic considerations that give rise to new bidding strategies of players. These new strategies, however, confirm O'Neill's result qualitatively: Rational players should not bid against each other. We then introduce a more general model of the game and show that escalatory competitive bids are compatible with equilibrium play. Equilibria with escalating bidding eventually realize a “draw†: Initial firmness (leading to escalation) is followed by conciliatory behavior that eventually implements a common commitment level.

Date: 1989
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002789033002003 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:33:y:1989:i:2:p:231-254

DOI: 10.1177/0022002789033002003

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Conflict Resolution from Peace Science Society (International)
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().