The Indo-Pakistani Arms Competition

Ido Oren
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Ido Oren: University of Minnesota

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1994, vol. 38, issue 2, 185-214

Abstract: The author applies to South Asia a theory of armament that he developed in the context of the superpowers' arms rivalry. The empirical findings are consistent with the results for the superpowers' case: India and Pakistan are found to have matched high levels of armaments with low levels and vice versa. Such results are analytically similar to empirical evidence on alliances showing that states, including India and Pakistan, often ally with the stronger against the weaker side. In both cases the evidence contradicts conventional wisdom on power balancing, internal and external, respectively. The authors' theory explains this otherwise anomalous phenomenon: states use strength not just as an indicator of capability but also of intentions: given the same amount of hostile behavior, weak states appear more aggressive than strong ones. Hence, if states worry about intentions more than about power, they would be attracted to stronger states precisely because of their strength, not despite it.

Date: 1994
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:38:y:1994:i:2:p:185-214

DOI: 10.1177/0022002794038002002

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