The Logic of Two-Level Games with Endogenous Domestic Coalitions

Jongryn Mo
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Jongryn Mo: University of Texas at Austin

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1994, vol. 38, issue 3, 402-422

Abstract: This article attempts to formalize and extend Putnam's conjecture that greater domestic constraints can be a bargaining advantage in international negotiations by means of a more realistic model of negotiator behavior. Unlike her counterpart in Putnam, the negotiator in my model has a direct interest, not coincident with those of her domestic constituents, in the bargaining outcome. She also has more leeway in domestic bargaining in that not all domestic constituents have veto power. The results of the analysis show that the relationship between the negotiator's domestic constraints and the bargaining outcome is more complex than Putnam's analysis suggests. The negotiator can be either better or worse off under greater domestic constraints. The conditions under which these different outcomes result depend on the distribution of political power between the negotiator and domestic constituents.

Date: 1994
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:38:y:1994:i:3:p:402-422

DOI: 10.1177/0022002794038003003

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