Settling Old Scores

Daniel Sutter
Additional contact information
Daniel Sutter: Old Dominion University

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1995, vol. 39, issue 1, 110-128

Abstract: Under certain conditions both the opponents and supporters of an authoritarian regime can benefit from the peaceful liberalization of the regime. The literature on transitions to democracy emphasizes the role of negotiated deals (pacts) in facilitating transitions. Political deals are not legally enforceable contracts; they are subject to opportunism by one of the parties. I examine how punishment of the ex-ruler(s) by a successor government after power has been transferred renders a pact ineffective and prevents a peaceful transition. Political asylum can alleviate the punishment dilemma, but the host nation can have an incentive to renege on its protection. A military government retains the power to reintervene in politics after transferring power to civilians. The possibility of reintervention allows the military to ensure compliance by other parties and overcome the punishment dilemma.

Date: 1995
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002795039001005 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:39:y:1995:i:1:p:110-128

DOI: 10.1177/0022002795039001005

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Conflict Resolution from Peace Science Society (International)
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().