The Electoral Consequences of Voting to Declare War

James L. Regens, Ronald Keith Gaddie and Brad Lockerbie
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Ronald Keith Gaddie: Tulane University
Brad Lockerbie: University of Georgia

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1995, vol. 39, issue 1, 168-182

Abstract: The conventional wisdom of national elections suggests that there are electoral costs associated with opposing declarations of war. However, an alternative literature contends that the negative electoral consequences of waging war may be borne by legislators who supported war, especially those members of the majority party. The authors test this assumption by examining the electoral consequences of supporting or opposing the declarations of war for the Mexican-American War, World War I, and the 1991 resolution to use force in the Persian Gulf. The results of their analysis of House elections indicate that although electoral costs were borne for opposing World War I, legislators who dissented often preselected themselves out of Congress through retirement or pursuit of other office. No evidence of electoral costs is evident in the wake of the Persian Gulf War, due in part to the influence of intervening events during the long period between the end of the war and the 1992 election.

Date: 1995
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:39:y:1995:i:1:p:168-182

DOI: 10.1177/0022002795039001007

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