 A Theory of Escalation And International ConflictLisa J. Carlson
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1995, vol. 39, issue 3, 511-534 Abstract: Escalation processes are found in many types of international conflict. However, a great deal of the theoretical and empirical literature on escalation is context specific and concentrates on explaining the outcomes of an escalation process. This approach has generated numerous insights; however, our understanding of escalation processes, in general, remains partial and incomplete. In this article, the author develops a two-sided incomplete information model to identify the kinds of escalation strategies states are likely to adopt in conflict. The model produces several hypotheses, one of which is tested empirically in the context of militarized interstate disputes. The hypothesis states that as the disparity between the players' cost tolerances increases, the lower cost tolerant actor is more likely to escalate to the maximum of his or her ability on the first move in the conflict. The results of the test confirm the theory's expectations of an inverse relationship between cost tolerance and an actor's escalation behavior. The article concludes by noting implications for future research on escalation processes. Date: 1995 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:39:y:1995:i:3:p:511-534 DOI: 10.1177/0022002795039003006 Access Statistics for this article More articles in Journal of Conflict Resolution from Peace Science Society (International) |
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