Coercive Power And Concession Making in Bilateral Negotiation

Carsten K. W. De Dreu
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Carsten K. W. De Dreu: University of Groningen, The Netherlands

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1995, vol. 39, issue 4, 646-670

Abstract: This experiment examined the effects of negotiators' and opponents' coercive capability on level of demand and on communication of threats and promises. Applying conflict spiral and deterrence perspectives inspired contrasting predictions. Subjects were given high, moderate, or low coercive power and learned that their opponents had low, moderate, or high coercive power. Subsequently, subjects negotiated through computers with opponents (in reality, simulated by a computer), who sent compellent threats or promises designed to induce some desired behavior. Higher levels of the focal negotiator's coercive power increased communication of threats but did not influence level of demand. Higher levels of the opponent's coercive power produced greater decline in level of demand but only when the opponent sent threats instead of promises. Power balance produced less communication of threats and greater decline of demand than power preponderance. The conclusion discusses limitations and contributions, as well as the applied value for mediation and dispute resolution.

Date: 1995
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:39:y:1995:i:4:p:646-670

DOI: 10.1177/0022002795039004003

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