Democracy and Compromise in Militarized Interstate Conflicts, 1816-1992

Michael Mousseau
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Michael Mousseau: Department of Political Science, Binghamton University

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1998, vol. 42, issue 2, 210-230

Abstract: Research has documented that democratic nations are about 30 times less likely to originate interstate wars and about 3 times less likely to originate militarized interstate disputes among themselves than other types of regimes. Compromise is a means for resolving conflict whereby disputants agree to mutual concessions. Many researchers contend that compromise is among the central defining features of democratic political culture. If a norm of compromise can explain the absence of wars between democratic nations, then one should expect to find a democratic inclination toward compromise in the path from the initial militarization of an interstate conflict to all-out war. An analysis of militarized interstate disputes originating as one-on-one confrontations occurring worldwide from 1816 to 1992 reveals robust support for the proposition. The results indicate that joint highly democratic dyads are about 3 times more likely than joint highly autocratic dyads to resolve their militarized conflicts with mutual concessions.

Date: 1998
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:42:y:1998:i:2:p:210-230

DOI: 10.1177/0022002798042002005

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