Partisanship, Macroeconomic Policy, and U.S. Uses of Force, 1949-1994

Benjamin Fordham
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Benjamin Fordham: Department of Political Science, University at Albany, SUNY

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1998, vol. 42, issue 4, 418-439

Abstract: Have Democratic and Republican presidents used force more often than members of the other party under some circumstances during the postwar era? This article presents evidence that unemployment and inflation produce differences in the likelihood of a diversionary use of force by presidents from different parties. Because Republicans are more reluctant than Democrats to use potentially inflationary macroeconomic policies to reduce unemployment, they are more likely to use military force than Democratic presidents when unemployment is high. One the other hand, because Democrats are reluctant to employ macroeconomic policies that might control inflation at the cost of increased unemployment, they are more likely to use military force than Republicans when facing high inflation.

Date: 1998
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:42:y:1998:i:4:p:418-439

DOI: 10.1177/0022002798042004002

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