Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate Wars

Caroline A. Hartzell
Additional contact information
Caroline A. Hartzell: Political Science Department, Gettysburg College

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1999, vol. 43, issue 1, 3-22

Abstract: Although the majority of civil wars end when one warring party achieves a victory over the other, negotiated agreements are growing more common as a means of ending intrastate conflict. To explain why some negotiated settlements prove stable and others do not, scholars have examined the impact of factors such as superpower conflict, group identities, and third-party guarantors. This article argues that those negotiated settlements that are the most extensively institutionalized—that is, that provide institutional guarantees for the security threats antagonists face as they move toward a situation of centralized state power—are the ones most likely to prove stable. An analysis of all settlements negotiated to end intrastate conflicts during the period between 1945 and 1997 supports this proposition.

Date: 1999
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002799043001001 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:43:y:1999:i:1:p:3-22

DOI: 10.1177/0022002799043001001

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Conflict Resolution from Peace Science Society (International)
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().