Domestic Politics, Absolute Deprivation, and the Use of Armed Force in Interstate Territorial Disputes, 1950-1990

Berger Heldt
Additional contact information
Berger Heldt: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Sweden

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1999, vol. 43, issue 4, 451-478

Abstract: Evidence suggests that a territorial dispute is almost a necessary condition for interstate war. By applying the diversionary theory of a relationship between domestic dissatisfaction and states' external aggression, the author examines the circumstances that push challenger states to use armed force in such disputes. This theory is refined by incorporating variables measuring risk and costs. The author contends that regime leaders are risk and cost averse, not risk and cost willing, as widely alleged. This applies in particular to democratically elected leaders. A new measure of dissatisfaction that draws on deprivation theory is provided. Using probit regression, an analysis covering 1950 to 1990 confirms most of the predictions but with two conspicuous exceptions: democracies are not more prone to use diversion than nondemocracies, and democracies show a disregard for the economic costs of armed diversion.

Date: 1999
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/43/4/451.abstract (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:43:y:1999:i:4:p:451-478

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Conflict Resolution from Peace Science Society (International)
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().