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Evolution in Democracy-War Dynamics

Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, Scott Gates and HÃ¥vard Hegre
Additional contact information
Sara McLaughlin Mitchell: Department of Political Science, Florida State University
Scott Gates: Department of Political Science, Michigan State University
HÃ¥vard Hegre: International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO)

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1999, vol. 43, issue 6, 771-792

Abstract: This article explores the evolutionary and endogenous relationship between democracy and war at the system level. Building on Kant, the authors argue that the rules and norms of behavior within and between democracies become more prevalent in international relations as the number of democracies in the system increases. The authors use Kalman filter analysis, which allows for the parameters in the models to vary over time. The results support the propositions that democratization tends to follow war, that democratization decreases the systemic amount of war, and that the substantive and pacific impact of democracy on war increases over time.

Date: 1999
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:43:y:1999:i:6:p:771-792

DOI: 10.1177/0022002799043006005

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