The Law of Small Numbers

James H. Lebovic
Additional contact information
James H. Lebovic: Department of Political Science George Washington University

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2002, vol. 46, issue 4, 455-483

Abstract: Armed with a new threat and promising technology, advocates of national missile defense (NMD) have framed the debate by presenting NMD as a break from traditional deterrence principles. The assumption that the United States faces new adversaries that cannot be deterred by U.S. offensive options and whether adversaries can and will use nuclear weapons to coerce the United States, given its inclination and ability to retaliate, are assessed. The effectiveness of NMD against various offensive threats is simulated. Conclusions indicate that NMD advocates have not made their case that cold war-era deterrence principles are ill suited to U.S. relations with fledgling nuclear states and that the expected value of a missile defense of any type and scale is low because it is unlikely to enhance global security above levels offered by retaliatory deterrence.

Date: 2002
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002702046004001 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:46:y:2002:i:4:p:455-483

DOI: 10.1177/0022002702046004001

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Conflict Resolution from Peace Science Society (International)
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().