Alliances, Then Democracy
Douglas M. Gibler and
Scott Wolford
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Douglas M. Gibler: Department of Political Science, University of Kentucky
Scott Wolford: Department of Political Science, Emory University
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2006, vol. 50, issue 1, 129-153
Abstract:
Previous studies have not established a consistent link between regime type and alliance formation, despite the relevance of the decision to ally in a number of arguments about regime type and alliance behavior. The inconsistency in these findings turns largely on choice of research design and variable definition; when the dependent variable is alliance formation, democratic dyads are unlikely to ally, but when the dependent variable is the presence of an alliance tie, democratic dyads are likely to be allied. Under a standard research design, the authors find both claims to be true and propose a test of an explanation for this tendency of autocratic states to democratize in alliances. They show that the presence of a defense pact with all neighboring states reduces the likelihood that a state will be targeted with a territorial militarized dispute, reduces the level of state militarization, and increases the likelihood of democratic transitions.
Keywords: Alliances; democracy; external threat; cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:50:y:2006:i:1:p:129-153
DOI: 10.1177/0022002705281360
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