Structural Equivalence and International Conflict

Zeev Maoz, Ranan D. Kuperman, Lesley Terris and Ilan Talmud
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Zeev Maoz: Department of Political Science, University of California, Davis
Ranan D. Kuperman: Department of Industrial Relations, University of Haifa, Israel
Lesley Terris: Department of Political Science, Tel-Aviv University, Israel
Ilan Talmud: Department of Sociology, University of Haifa, Israel

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2006, vol. 50, issue 5, 664-689

Abstract: The concept of international affinity—albeit under different names—captures a central place in international relations research. This study examines how different types of affinity affect the likelihood of conflict between states. The authors discuss different types of affinities as these appear in the realist and liberal paradigms. They offer a social networks conception of structural affinity—the concept of structural equivalence —which reflects the similarity of international ties across a set of different networks. They test the hypotheses derived from these paradigms, using both existing measures of affinity and their own structural equivalence measures. Their findings suggest that (1) strategic affinity has a consistent dampening effect on the probability of dyadic conflict, (2) trade-related affinity does consistently affect the probability of dyadic conflict, and (3) intergovernmental organization-related affinity has a negative impact on conflict, mostly in the twentieth century.

Keywords: international affinity; structural equivalence; dyadic conflict; international networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:50:y:2006:i:5:p:664-689

DOI: 10.1177/0022002706291053

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