Bargaining, Nuclear Proliferation, and Interstate Disputes

Erik Gartzke and Dong-Joon Jo
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Erik Gartzke: Department of Political Science University of California, San Diego
Dong-Joon Jo: Department of International Relations University of Seoul, Republic of Korea

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2009, vol. 53, issue 2, 209-233

Abstract: Contrasting claims about the consequences of nuclear weapons rely on different interpretations about how leaders respond to risk, uncertainty, and the balance of power. Nuclear optimists use deterrence theory to argue that proliferation can promote stability and inhibit the use of force. Pessimists argue that proliferation precipitates nuclear hubris, accident, or anger that heightens the risk of war. It is also possible that nuclear weapons have no net effect on dispute propensity. Since states fashion their own bargains, nuclear status is bound to influence the distribution of influence. Proliferation also reflects existing tensions, biasing upward the apparent impact of nuclear weapons on conventional conflict. Instrumenting for the decision to proliferate, the authors find that nuclear weapons increase diplomatic status without much affecting whether states fight.

Keywords: nuclear proliferation; nuclear weapons; militarized disputes; conflict; diplomacy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:53:y:2009:i:2:p:209-233

DOI: 10.1177/0022002708330289

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