Target Concessions in the Shadow of Intervention

Amy Yuen
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Amy Yuen: Department of Political Science Middlebury College, Middlebury, VT

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2009, vol. 53, issue 5, 745-773

Abstract: Why do targets sometimes make concessions when third parties offer assistance? Both the extended deterrence and alliance literatures point to unreliable third parties to explain deterrence failure and target acquiescence. On the other hand, the alliance literature also suggests that third parties present a moral-hazard situation in which targets will behave less prudently when they have outside support. Without dismissing the importance of these dynamics, I demonstrate that targets will still make concessions when intervention is certain, and that interveners do not always embolden targets in crisis situations. Counterintuitively, interveners alter the bargaining situation, shifting the bargaining space so that conceding is more attractive than war for the target state. Instead of emboldening targets, third parties deter larger demands and produce settlement outcomes that reduce the burden on the target.

Keywords: third-party intervention; bargaining; moral hazard; deterrence; formal model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:53:y:2009:i:5:p:745-773

DOI: 10.1177/0022002709339046

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