Partisan Heterogeneity and International Cooperation

Christina J. Schneider and Johannes Urpelainen

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2014, vol. 58, issue 1, 120-142

Abstract: This article analyzes the relationship between partisan heterogeneity and cooperation in international organizations. We argue that partisan heterogeneity increases distributional conflict among states during intergovernmental negotiations, thereby increasing the costs of cooperation. This decreases governments’ willingness to contribute to cooperative efforts. We test the theory against data on governments’ financial contributions to the European Development Fund. The empirical analyses robustly demonstrate that partisan heterogeneity reduces governments’ incentives to contribute to European cooperation on international development. On a more general level, we offer new perspective on the role of domestic politics in international cooperation.

Keywords: partisan heterogeneity; international cooperation; domestic politics; European Union; European Development Fund (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:58:y:2014:i:1:p:120-142

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