Legislative Governance in Times of International Terrorism

Thomas König () and Daniel Finke
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Thomas König: University of Mannheim, Mannheim, Germany
Daniel Finke: Department of Political Science, University Heidelberg, Heidelberg, Germany

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2015, vol. 59, issue 2, 262-282

Abstract: How do political parties with different policy-making interests and veto power respond to international terrorism—can coalition parties and bicameral legislatures overcome their policy-making tensions and form a unified front for adopting counterterrorist measures? This study examines German counterterrorist legislation before and after the attacks of 9/11 by using a dictionary-based computerized text analysis. Our findings demonstrate that in times of low threat, the level of intra-coalition and bicameral conflict decreases the likelihood of counterterrorist legislation. However, in the event of a high external threat, this effect disappears despite the continuing divergence in partisan policy preferences. This suggests that a high external threat imposes inaction costs on political parties, which they attempt to avoid by adopting counterterrorist measures in the legislative arena.

Keywords: terrorism; legislative governance; coalition politics; bicameralism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:59:y:2015:i:2:p:262-282

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