Why Do States Join Some Universal Treaties but Not Others? An Analysis of Treaty Commitment Preferences

Yonatan Lupu

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2016, vol. 60, issue 7, 1219-1250

Abstract: Preferences are crucial to the analysis of many key questions regarding international institutions. This article analyzes the key predictors of states’ preferences over universal treaties. It does so by using a spatial-modeling approach that conceptualizes a treaty commitment preference space that includes agreements across multiple policy areas. I analyze the treaty commitment preference space in order to better understand the key dimensions of these preferences. I find that economics, and particularly trade, is the clearest and most consistent predictor of treaty commitment preferences, including with respect to many treaties in noneconomic policy areas.

Keywords: cooperation; international cooperation; international institutions; international treaties (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:60:y:2016:i:7:p:1219-1250

DOI: 10.1177/0022002714560344

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