Strategic Sovereignty

Jessica Steinberg

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2016, vol. 60, issue 8, 1503-1528

Abstract: In some regions of natural resource extraction, embedded local populations receive transfers that compensate them for environmental consequences of extraction; while in others, these populations receive no benefits and endure negative environmental externalities, which can lead to violent protest. This article develops a formal model of the strategic dynamics among a government, a natural resource extraction firm, and a local population in an extractive region to understand the variation in extractive outcomes. The model specifies the conditions under which firms will provide promised transfers to a local population, distributive conflict will occur, and how the government will respond.

Keywords: natural resource extraction; local conflict; environmental externalities; formal model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:60:y:2016:i:8:p:1503-1528

DOI: 10.1177/0022002714564429

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